题目：Private equity sponsors, law firm relationships, and loan contracts in leveraged buyouts
时间：2024年6月20日（周四）10:00-12:00
地点：体育外围平台APP紫金港校区体育外围平台APPA423
主讲人：Yijia (Eddie) Zhao副教授，美国马萨诸塞大学（波士顿）会计与金融系
主持人：董望副教授，体育外围平台APP
主持人简介：
美国马萨诸塞大学（波士顿）会计与金融系副教授，主要研究方向为金融中介，银行与金融机构，公司金融，债券市场，IPO。于美国南卡罗莱纳大学Darla Moore商学院获金融学博士学位。在Management Science, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Journal of Business Ethics, Journal of Corporate Finance 等期刊发表多篇文章。文章曾获Financial Management Association (FMA) 最佳金融机构与市场论文奖。担任Journal of Business Ethics, Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Banking and Finance, Journal of Empirical Finance，Journal of Financial Research, Pacific-Basin Journal of Finance等期刊匿名审稿人。牛津银行业手册（第四版）（The Oxford Handbook of Banking, 4th Edition）丛书作者之一。
摘要：
We find that a private equity (PE) sponsor’s relationship with the law firm that advises banks (i.e., lender law firm) leads to weakened creditor protection in loan terms of leveraged buyouts. When the PE-Lender Law Firm relationship is stronger, loans are less likely to have a dividend payout restriction and have fewer covenants overall. This finding is robust using PE-Lender Law Firm geographic distance as an instrument for PE-Lender Law Firm relationship. Lead banks that use PE sponsors’ relationship law firms are more likely to be included in the lending syndicate of next buyout deal of the sponsor. Loans with stronger PE-Lender Law Firm relationships experience weaker loan investor demand in the primary market and higher likelihood of subsequent defaults. Taken together, our paper uncovers PE sponsors’ relationship with banks’ legal counsel as an important channel through which PE sponsors exert bargaining power in buyout loan contract negotiations, and provides new perspective to the debate on the controversial role of PE sponsors.
