题目：The unintended consequence of executive-firm match on corporate voluntary disclosure: Evidence from non-GAAP earnings
时间：2024年6月21日（周五）10:00-12:00
地点：体育外围平台APP紫金港校区体育外围平台APPA423
主讲人：KE Yun，University of Texas at El Paso
主持人：董望副教授，体育外围平台APP
主持人简介：
KE Yun，University of British Columbia会计学博士，本科就读于清华大学，现任University of Texas at El Paso助理教授，曾任职Brock University助理教授 。
摘要：
Prior literature often attributes the increased likelihood and reduced quality of non-GAAP earnings to managerial opportunism. We propose an alternative explanation that this phenomenon may be driven by executive-firm match, particularly related to the demand of general managerial skills. These skills have become increasingly important for CEOs and have been in high demand by firms over the past two decades. Using the General Ability Index (GAI) developed by Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013), we explore whether and how executive-firm match affects the use of non-GAAP earnings, an important type of voluntary disclosure. We document the dark side of executive-firm match by demonstrating that CEOs with higher general managerial skills (i.e., generalist CEOs) are more likely to provide non-GAAP earnings than specialist CEOs. This finding holds to a battery of robustness tests and shows considerable cross-sectional variations. However, we find that the quality of non-GAAP earnings, measured by several ways, provided by generalist CEOs tends to be lower than that provided by specialist CEOs. Overall, our study provides new evidence of how executive-firm match related to general and firm-specific managerial capital can shape firms’ disclosure differently, resulting in unintended consequences.
