题目: Budget Disclosure in Crowdfunding: Information Asymmetry and Cost Transparency
时间：2024年7月24日上午 10：00
地点：体育外围平台APP紫金港校区体育外围平台APPA523
主讲人：童勋 副教授，格罗宁根大学
主持人：霍宝锋 教授，体育外围平台APP
主讲人简介：
Dr. Xun (Bruce) Tong is an Associate Professor in Supply Chain Management at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands. His research mainly focuses on environmental sustainability, safety, the integration of new technologies, crowdfunding, and leadership within operations and supply chain management. He utilizes econometric analyses and behavioral experiments in his research. His work has appeared in journals such as the Journal of Operations Management, Decision Sciences, International Journal of Production Economics, and Transportation Research Part E, among others. His research has been shortlisted as a Best Paper finalist at both the Academy of Management Annual Conference (Boston, 2019) and the Decision Science Annual Conference (Atlanta, 2023). He holds the position of Associate Editor at the Journal of Operations Management.
讲座摘要：This study explores the impact of voluntarily disclosing sensitive cost information on the funding performance of crowdfunding campaigns. Unlike traditional marketing enhancements, revealing the project budget serves as an innovative way to inform the crowd about the operations required to develop and execute an entrepreneurship project, reflecting the emerging trend of cost transparency in the retail sector, as documented in experiment and field studies. The research further investigates the varying effects of this disclosure based on the gender of the campaign creator and the nature of the cost items (fixed versus variable costs). Our methodology and findings are based on data collected following the introduction of Kickstarter's Project Budget tool in 2019. We analyzed our data using coarsened exact matching to differentiate between projects that disclosed their budgets and those that did not. To mitigate the potential bias from the voluntary provision of budget information, we employed an endogenous treatment effect model and peer average-style instruments. Our analysis revealed that disclosing budget information can more than double funding performance, outperforming many other information disclosure mechanisms reported in the literature. Female project creators, in particular, benefitted 20%-30% more than their male counterparts. Although a higher ratio of fixed costs to total costs, suggesting a larger profit margin, slightly decreased the benefits of disclosure, it did not reverse the positive impact of cost transparency. Our findings demonstrate robustness across multiple robustness checks. This paper is under the second round review at MSOM.
